The essay shows how Heidegger's understanding of physis in Aristotle lays the foundation for his understanding of Ereignis. The essay draws on Heidegger's lecture courses, published and un published, particularly "On the Being and Conception of Physis." After introductory remarks on how Heidegger reads Aristotle "pheno menologically" in general, the essay focuses on how Heidegger reads physis as a mode of Being (ousia) by reading kinesis as a mode of Being, specifically as energeia ateles (incomplete Being). But energeia ateles is characterized by Heidegger as Wiederholung (retrieve of possibility) and as Eignung (appropriation of dynamis for appearance). On the basis of that crucial reading of physis, the essay goes on to show how physis-as-dynamis is the foundation for Ereignis in Sein und Zeit through the radical transformation of Wiederholung in natural beings into resolve in Dasein.
We know as well that Heidegger projected a book prior to Sein und Zeit that was to summarize his Aristotle interpretations, and that Paul Natorp had Heidegger hired at Marburg in 1923 on the basis of the introduction to that work.17 And the influence has continued to work even on the later Heidegger.
In the 'fifties he told his students, "It is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years."18 And to judge by interview that the present writer had with Heidegger in 1971, Heidegger himself continues living out that program to this day.
But if the influence is undeniable, the "how" and "how far" of it remain one of Heidegger's best-kept secrets.
Index enough of the secret is the infrequency with which Heidegger scholarship elaborates the Aristotelian bases of Heidegger's work.1^ And this is no fault of the commentators.
Heidegger has published only one essay devoted entirely to Aristotle ("Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis; Aristotle's Physik B, 1"
, and even there the theme is Aristotle and not his influence on - 
17
Heidegger.
Likewise, in Sein und Zeit, where Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page, the nature of the influence is concealed behind the language of phenomenology.
The secret lies hidden in Heidegger's courses from 1919 through 1952, and since it is not clear that his Gesamtausgabe will include the early Freiburg courses (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) , the secret may be kept closed until his Nachlasse become available. But with the appearance this year of his 1925-26 course, Logik (Aristoteles), the deep influence of the Peri Hermeneias (specifically regarding logos apophantikos) and Metaphysics TH, 10 (aletheia) on Sein und Zeit will be shown. Likewise the publica tion of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie will clarify Heidegger's reading of the meaning and transformation of Aristotle's energeia with respect to the medieval essentia-existentia and Heidegger's own "onto logical difference." Meanwhile there exist works that either grew out of these early courses or extend them or report their contents. Among these is Prof. Helene Weiss' Kausalitât und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristotles (1942),21 which Heidegger recommended to his seminar students in 1951 as one of the few good works on the Physics and perhaps on Aristotle's thought as a whole.
(That recommendation is perhaps not uninfluenced by the fact that Professor Weiss, a former student of Heidegger's, reports, often in close paraphrase, much of the content of Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle in the ' t w e n t i e s . However, since Heidegger* *s explications of dynamis, energeia, and physis are generally constant from the early 'twenties up through the winter semester of 1951-52 (^Ubungen im Lesen: Aristoteles, Metaphysik,IV und IX, 10") and differ only in minor and generally contextual ways from "Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis...", we will direct our attention principally to that latter text.
II. Reading Aristotle "Phenomenologically"
Crucial to the argument we are developing is the "method" according to which Heidegger reads Aristotle at all. In appearing, a being appears as^ something meaningful in the broadest sense -as a shield that the warrier can use or as the ship he can launch or as the god he can reverence or challenge.
This "as"-character bespeaks the arrival of meaning amongst beings, the "irruption" that occurs only with the arrival of man.
If men can deal with beings only insofar as they appear a£ such and so, the philosopher is distinguished by the fact that he asks the question of their "appearing-as" as such, that is, the question of their "Being."
To say that much is to indicate two things: (1) Whenever the Greeks speak of to on, they always imply to on hei....a being in terms of some modality of meaningful presence, even if the "as" (hei) is not expressly articulated.
This "ad^dimension of beings, which is expressed in the "is" of apophantic discourse, articulates the Being-dimension of beings. Hence to on always means "a-being-in-a-modality-of-Being," and Heidegger can correctly translate tco on as das seiend-Sein.^ To express this unity Aristotle often uses ousia, which, derived through the participle ousa from 27*On thinking "Greeker than the Greeks" cf. 
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einai, can adequately be translated by the neologism "is-ness" (Seiendheit).3^ Therefore the question that defines first philosophy, "What is to on?" must be fleshed out to say uWhat is to on_ hëi on?" -that is, it does not seek an ontic answer (a shield or ship or god) but rather an ontological one. The question focuses on the "as-ness" or "isness" as such, and so it comes down to the question "What is is-ness?" (tis hS" ousia;), indeed, not the is-ness of any delimited region of beings, but of all beings in terms of the analogical unity governing all possible modes of is-ness.* 33 3 4 Aristotle's aporetic question about ousia is his formulation of the question of the meaning of Being.
(2) To speak of beings as phainomena is to at least imply the locus of their meaning ful appearance, the correlative horizon wherein that meaningfulness is articulated.
Beings as phainomena are correlative to modes of "awareness" (Vernehmen) in the broadest sense, to a legein or noein that is revelatory of the phainomenon as what and how it is. Without logos, no is-ness.3T he uniqueness of man as "the living being who has logos" (zSion logon echon)3^ is that his essence is the locus of meaning and that he has access to beings only in terms of their "appearance-as..." in logos or noein. Aristotle thematizes the function of logos as deloun (to make visible), apophainesthai (to show forth), and most importantly as alëtheuein (to uncover or to bring out of hiddenness).3^ For men to on is always on legomenon, "read" beings, beings articulated according to the multi plicity of modes of meaningful presence that are expressed in the implicit "as" or the explicit "is" of apophantic discourse.
To summarize these two points: If to on always implies a Being-dimension that is expressed in the "as" (hei) , the only locus of this Being-dimension is man's essence as logos or alëtheuein. To on and legein are apriori correlative; man's very nature is "phenomenological (legein ta phainomena). And if man raises the question of first philosophy (legein to on hëi on), then the resultant ontology must be phenomenology. 
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Before moving on, let us ask whether this "explicitation" of the bases of Aristotle's philosophical framework is not an unjustifiable importation of contemporary (specifically Husserlian) perspectives into Greek thought. What is ultimately at stake here is the question whether any interpretation of Greek thought, whether performed by Thomas Aquinas, Werner Jaeger, or William David Ross, can hope to be without presupposi tions. And Heidegger's justification of his own phenomenological reading of Aristotle is grounded in the ineluctability of the phenomenological nature of man himself: all knowing, including the knowing of an Aristo telian text, is knowing in and through the interpretative "as"-structure of a legein. But rather than unfolding the important issue of the hermeneutical "fore"-structure, let me simply let Heidegger speak for himself, and so leave open the question that he himself poses here.
(I cite at some length because this paragraph reveals the broad context with in which Heidegger's reading of Greek philosophy moves.)
The totality of beings is the field from which the positive sciences always acquire their regions of objects.... Directed straight at beings, these sciences in their totality undertake the investigation of every thing that is. Thus there seems to be no field left over for philos ophy, that science which from antiquity has been considered the foundational science. But has not Greek philosophy, ever since its decisive origins, made "beings" the very object of its questioning? To be sure -but not in order to determine this or that being, but rather to understand beings as being ^als In carrying out the search for the common meaning that analogically unifies the many meanings of beings, one either presumes or thematic ally reinvestigates the meaning of the very locus of any and all meaning: logos as the "faculty" of revealing.
That insight is the basis for Heidegger*s transformation of Aristotle*s problematic.
If beings are present in logos in many ways, those "many ways** are themselves modifica tions of logos, and hence logos itself appears in many ways.
If logos in its alestheuein-funetion has Being in a variety of ways, then the first and foundational step towards clarifying the meaning of Being (the unity of modes in which beings appear) becomes the questioning of the unity of the many modes in which logos appears. Logos must, as it were, turn on itself and carry out an alêtheuein of the alêtheia-process itself in its unity. And since the modifications of logos are correlative to the modes of appearance of beings, the discovery of the unity of the modes of appearance of logos provides the philosopher with the a priori horizon Given Aristotle's understanding of the aletheuein-function of logos as categorial-assertive "making present," for him the analogical unity of the many modes of the presentness of beings is "pure presentness as such," pure energeia or eidos correlative to apophantic logos. If Heidegger hopes to justify any claim that such a formulation is not revel atory of the authentic meaning of Being, he will have to critically reformulate the fundamental meaning of logos at a level deeper than the categorial-assertive level of synthesis-dihairesis at which Aristotle stopped.
If it could be shown -as the course Logik (Aristoteles) attempts to do in terms of Aristotelian texts and as Sein und Zeit attempts to do by a hermeneutic of "factical life" -if it could be shown that the apophantic logos of Aristotle is a derived form of a more basic "dynamic" temporal unity of aletheuein, then the way would be opened to answering the question of the unified meaning of Being in a more fundamental way that was possible to Aristotle. (tentatively, "appropriation"), then one might be able to under stand the justification for calling the meaning of Being (dynamis hei dynamis) by the name Ereignis, without having to chase the word down the dubious paths of German etymologies.42 But that is only a personal pre ference. We may now take up the second topic of this section, namely, the concrete "shape" of the phenomenological correlation as Heidegger sees this articulated in the key terms of the Aristotelian lexicon.
II. 2. Phenomenology: An Aristotelian Lexicon
We have seen that all human knowing, as phenomenological, is knowing a being in a mode of its presence-as in logos, that is, in a mode of its Being.
In Aristotle these modes of Being are expressed in terms of eidos, the "appearance" of a being, where this appearance is revelatory of what and how the being is. That Aristotle*s thematization of the modes of Being as modes of visibility (eidos: "the seen," derived from horao, "I see") carries over aspects of the Platonic emphasis on seeing, is not our concern here.
Rather what is important is Aristotle*s ontological transformation of Plato's eidos. So differently does Aristotle experience beings from the way Plato does, that he radically changes the phenomenological correlativity of eidos and logos (already known by Plato) and so achieves a more adequate ontological formulation.43 Aristotle's eidos, as the Being of a being, can not be some "thing" existing off by itself apart from logos (ou choriston on) , but rather is eidos only in_ logos (all e _ kata ton logon -Physics B, 1, 193 b 5). Both the Platonic eidos and the Aristotelian eidos are formula tions of Being, and both are correlative to some kind of logos. But in Aristotle's unique formulation of that correlativity, Heidegger finds a more "adequate" phenomenological formulation that is at the same time a more "adequate" ontological formulation.
Insofar as Plato's eidos (at least as Aristotle reads it) can stand off on its own, it tends towards ontical characterization (i.e., as a being), whereas insofar as Aristotle's eidos appears only in the apophantic declaration about a being (i.e., in a legein of an on), it is a properly onto-logical characterization, that is, it names Being. We see here again how ontology is controlled by phenomenology. If Aristotle's ontology is more to the point (zur Sache) than Plato's, it is because his phenomenology is more properly formulated. And indeed, if Heidegger's "onto-logy" is to lay claim to more originality than Aristotle's, it can only be because its thematization of logos would supposedly issue in a formulation of phenomeno-logy that is more to the point.
But back to the lexicon.
If the phenomenological correlativity can be articulated as eidos -logos, the eidos as the presentness of a being in what and how it is has the element of stability about it, and this stability is expressed in energeia and entelecheia. Aristotle often speaks of tu onta Rather peras means self-limitation in the sense of a "holding of itself together" such that a being can stand of itself and so b e . To express the unity of all these modes of stability as modes of Being we may say: A being, standing or lying present (ousia etc.) in its self-limitation (peras) and shining forth as what it is (eidos) , "has itself" (cf. echein) "in its fulfillment" (eri telei) : entel-echeia. Likewise, if all these meanings be equally expressed by the Greek ergon -not in the sense of the end-product of technical making but primarily in the sense of what has been placed into the self-mani festation of its own eidos -then en-erg-eia says the same as en-telecheia. All these terms express a being-in-its-Being, and as such are correlative with logos.
Two final lexical entries: morphe and aei. Heidegger reads morph? as saying the "same" as eidos (appearance) with the added nuance of a being's "placing itself into the appearance" (die GesteH u n g in das Aussehen^ ). What this nuance achieves is a delineation of the difference of Aristotelian eidos from the Platonic.
"Overwhelmed as it were by the essence of eidos," Heidegger writes, "Plato grasped eidos itself in turn as something present for itself and thus as something common (koinon) to the individual 'beings' 'which stand in such an appearance* ? thereby the individual, as subordinate to idea as the real being, was displaced into the role of non-being.As over against that, Aristotle grasps the individual as a real being, that is, something that is insofar as it places itself into its own eidos which appears in logos. Conversely: "The clue by which eidos -and thereby also morph? -are graspable is logos."5^ "Morphe must be understood from eidos, and eidos must be understood from logos."53-In summary:
"With this translation of morph?, 'placement into the appearance,' we mean to express chiefly two things that are equal in the Greek sense £ of the word J and that are lacking in the word *form« ' First: placement into the appearance as a mode of presence: ousia; morphe is not an ontic property present in material, but a mode of Being.
Second: 'placement into the appearance' as movement, kinesis, which 'moment' is radically lacking in the concept of form."52 
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argues that aei is to be understood not in terms of "limitless duration" (that would be the apeirakis that is the very opposite of aei) but rather in terms of presentness in peras. A being that is "eternal" (aidion) is not a being that is "always going on without ceasing" but rather one that is authentically there for the time being. When Aeschylus' Prometheus speaks of ho aei kraton (Prometheus, 1. 937) he does not mean "the eternal king" but "whoever is king at the time."
If aei names an ontological characteristic of beings-in-Being (cf. the highest being as aei on), it designates not chronological permanance but rather primarily stability within peras-and for that reason perhaps permanence. Again, the focus of the Greek understanding of Being is on presentness in unhiddenness (algtheia).
Here we stop our preliminary sketch of how Heidegger reads Aristotle phenomenologically. What may seem like a complex journey through Aristotle and his lexicon can be briefly summarized as follows. The uniqueness of man among the animals is that with him there arrives meaning, indeed that he has access to beings only in terms of their articulated presence in logos. Man's very Being is logos, whose alêtheia-function is that whereby and wherein the is-ness of beings becomes manifest. This isness is expressed equally as eidos, ousia# entelecheia and energeia. Furthermore, the primary philosophical task is the determination of isness as such, the analogical unity that governs all possible modes of presentness of beings.
The question about the unified meaning of ousia rests on a prior (thematic or unthematic) understanding of the analogical unity of Being of logos itself. Heidegger's radically different thematization of the Being of logos is the basis of his claim that the authentic meaning of Being remains forgotten in Aristotle, and it is as well the starting point for his own question about the meaning of Being as pure dynamis.
III. Heidegger's Reading of PHYSIS in Aristotle
The preceding is prologue to the present task of understanding how Heidegger reads the meaning of Aristotle's physis as dynamis. The final goal of this paper is to understand how such a reading provides Heidegger with the "model" for understanding the meaning of Being as such as Ereignis. Briefly: the discovery that physis as dynamis is the meaning of the Being of one particular region of beings (Aristotle's physei on or natural beings) raises the question of whether the heretofore undiscovered analogical unity of all the modes of Being of all regions of beings is not itself dynamis.
To raise that question is to enter upon the project of Sein und Zeit. The first three divisions can be summarized briefly, more or less in thesis form. It is the last division that forms the major task of the essay and so will require more attention.
III. 1. Introduction: The Optic
For Heidegger, Aristotle* *s Physics remains the hidden basis on which is constructed the entire metaphysical tradition.
Indeed, the Physics is it self a metaphysical work.55 Not at all a book about what we call physics today, it is a regional ontology that inquires into the Beingness (ousia) of a particular group of beings, "natural beings." But more than that, insofar as Aristotle's physis is a regional narrowing of the originally broader understanding of physis as Being as such, the work preserves an echo of those meditations on Being that characterize the origin of Greek thinking in Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. We may expect, therefore, that in interpreting physis in Aristotle's narrower sense, Heidegger will attempt as well to recall the original meaning of physis. 
*
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The decisive orientation in the determination of the meaning of physis in Aristotle is twofold: (1) Physis is a kind of Beingness, and so the inquiry into physis is an ontological one? and (2 ) the clue to the onto logical characterization of physis is kinesis (cf. Physics A, 2, 185 a 12ff: ta physei j^ontaj kinoumena einai) . These two issues present one task: the discernment of kinesis as a kind of Beingness. 57
we catch a glimpse here of the overarching problematic that controls all of Heidegger*s thinking: Being and time, or in Aristotelian terms, ousia and kinesis, where the "and" expresses the central problem.
(To anticipate for a moment, we may say that the problem of the relation between each of the two will be worked out in terms of the time-character of energeia, specifically energeia atel^s.)
The crucial guidelines are established.
The The origin and ordering of artifacts is their maker's provision (eidos prohaireton) of the finished product. As a guiding principle, this provision stands outside of the product, with the result that the product cannot "place itself back into its arche. The natural being, on the other hand, "roots" in the sense of going back into and preserving its own arche.61 The supreme importance of this dimension of returning to or staying with the origin of movedness (which ultimately jls Wiederholung as the basic characteristic of Being as such) emerges below.
III. 3. PHYSIS is a kind of Beingness
The crucial sentence of this chapter of the Physics reads : "Every thing with an arche of the kind described has physis. And all these things are (i.e., have Being) of the specific kind: ousia."62
The previous issues in the chapter have all been directed towards this ontological characterization of physis as a mode of Beingness. The major task of the essay can now be broached. I call this goal the "kinetic-ontological characteriza tion of physis," that is , the exhibition of the Being-structure of physis by exhibiting the Being-structure of kinesis. The argument has the following formal structure: (1) Beingness for Aristotle is always entelecheia or energeia. (2) But Aristotle reads the energeia that is physis in terms of kinesis as energeia ateles. (3) Therefore, Aristotle reads the Being ness that is physis in terms of energeia ateles. Clearly the central issue is the meaning of energeia ateles, and it is there that we concentrate our attention.
If physis is a kind of Beingness and if the clue to defining physis is kinesis, how is kinesis to be characterized ontologically and how does this
III. 4. A. PHYSIS as DYNAMIS:"Wiederholung"
Since man has no access to beings except in terms of their Being, i.e., their meaningful presence in logos, and since Being for Aristotle is expressed as energeia, then man has no access to beings except insofar as they are in energeia. But because the telos of entelecheia and the erg tan of energeia express the element of stability, it is clear that man has access to beings only insofar as they have stability about them. Al though that does not preclude-especially in Aristotle-that movement (as non-stability) be a mode of Being, it does inform us how moving beings must show up in logos if they are to show up at all. They must appear in the aspect of rest or constancy in being present. But if rest or stability means being en. telei (in completion) and if the very nature of a moving being is to be ateles (not in completion), then the movement of moving beings would indeed seem to be excluded from Being (cf. me o n , Physics G, 2, 201 b 20f.). However, the genius of Aristotle consists in the fact that he grasps movement precisely a£ < a kind of Being, hence as a kind of energeia (cf.
energeia t i s, Physics G, 2, 201 b 30f.). If a being can show up in logos only as en telei T and if a moving being as moving is ateles, then the movement of a moving being is energeia ateles. A moving being as moving is present in logos as standing in its telos but as not yet having come into its telos.T o take a growing thing as what it fundamentally and authentically is,
namely, as growing, means to take it as appearing (en endoi), but appearing in such a way that the appearing brings with it into the eidos a non appearing.
Moreover, the non-appearing is not simply absence from Rather "the wonder of it" is that the non-appearance itself shows up and is present in logos. The presentness in logos of the non-appearance of the plant is the condition for the possi bility of the presentness in logos of the plant as plant, that is, as moving/growing-in Aristotelian terms, as on dynamei. If logos does not "see" the Being-absent of the plant, it does not "see"the plant as what it fundamentally and authentically is^, namely, a being whose Being is dynamis.
We can readily see the appearance of that green leafy thing over there; but as what do we make present to ourselves the non-appearance, in order that we see it a£ a^ plant? The non-appearance is present as an "An-sich-Halten,as an "Abwesung" that is an "In-sich-Ziiruckgehen."66 The plant's "withdrawing into itself" express the fact that it constantly maintains itself in the non-appearing source of its appearing.
Such withholding from presence as the very condition for coming to presence as what it is is what is meant by dynamis, the mode of Being of those beings that "hide" themselves as the condition for presenting themselves.
This interplay of appearing by hiding bespeaks a twofoldness: (1) The hiding is the source of the possibility of appearing, and (2 ) the appearing happens only by keeping the source of its appearance hidden, in such a way that the hidden source always remains source for appearing. A contrast of natural beings with arti facts highlights this unique ontological character of physis.67
The house under construction has iri itself no source for its appear ance as house-under-construction (on. dynamei). That source is the architect or constructor, and specifically his provision (eidos prohaireton) of what the completed house will look like. Unlike the * 6 5 6 6 * 6 8 technêi on hei dynaton (the house as under-construction), the plant again and again draws up from its hidden source the possibility of its appearance as growing.
The plant keeps its arche within itself. More over, when the house under construction comes to full appearance as what it is (that is, when logos can articulate the apophansis, "Now it's a house") then the energeia is teleia, then the house has left behind all the not-yet-ness of dynamis/energeia ateles, or better, "has precisely brought it forth along with itself into the fulfilling of the ful-filled appearance."b y But natural beings, insofar as they remain natural and therefore in movement, can never bring their not-yet-ness completely into telos. They must "let" their dynamis remain a s dynamis if thê 'WEG 367: ihr Erstaunliches.
65-
Cf. WEG 356: an-sich-haltenden.
66-WEG 369.
• F o r the following remarks, cf. WEG 320ff.
68-WEG 357.
64
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natural being is indeed to remain an on dynamei. By "letting" possi bility remain possibility (i.e., hidden source), the being appears as what it is, a being as moving, that is, as appearing by not fully appearing. We may hazard a word to describe this fact of "allowing" possibility to remain possibility. We may say that the natural beingunlike the artifact-keeps on repeating its possibility (re-petere: to grasp again and again). Yet in "grasping" possibility again and again, the natural being does not bring the hidden source out of hiddenness into full appearance. The re-grasping of possibility as possibility is the re-trieving (re-finding) of possibility as what it is: hidden source for incomplete appearance of the moving being. The "finding" is not a bringing of possibility into completion and full appearance, but a bringing forth again and again (a Wiederholung) of possibility as possibility. Such words as "repetition" and "retrieve" are Heidegger's halting attempts to enunciate the unique form of Being that is dynamis, presence by absence. The continual returning to, staying with, or repeating-retrieving of absence as the hidden source for presence-Wiederholung-is that mode of Being that characterizes the physis of the physei o n . Presence-by-absence is the unified twofold ness of physis.69
III. 4. B. PHYSIS as DYNAMIS: "Eignung"
How Heidegger translates dynamis and the justification he gives for that translation are important to our argument that physis-as-dynamis is the "model" for Heidegger's understanding of Ereignis. We have seen that crucial to the understanding of physis is the ontological clarifica tion of kinesis as energeia atelês. (incomplete Being). Natural beings have their Being as Being-underway-to-telos-in Greek, as genesis. A contrast of the generation of natural beings with that of artifacts will explain Heidegger's translation of dynamis as Eignung ("appropriation").Â ll kinesis is metabole, the change-over of something into something, such that the very act of change itself comes to appearance as what it is, namely as genesis. Let us take the example of the construction of a table. Lying around the carpenter shop is plenty of "material" with the eidos "wood." But as simply lying there this wood is not yet considered hylë for, say, a table. For the wood to be read as hyle, the carpenter must have in mind (cf. eidos prohaireton) a new function for it, namely, as wood for a table. Precisely in its being ordered to a new eidos, the wood that just lies there becomes wood for..., or appropriated wood. Thus in a similar example, Aristotle distinguishes (Physics G, 1, 201 a 30ff.) between bronze simply as bronze (he tou chalkou entelecheia hêi chalkos) and bronze seen as appropriate for making a statue (ho_ chalkos dynamei andrias). The latter is controlled by the provision and prescrip tion (cf. kata ton logon, ibid. 33f.) of a new eidos for the bronze.
'WEG 365-369, and J. Sniezewski,"Wachstum," Synergist 6 (1973), 69 ff.
^®'For what follows, cf. WEG 352-364. "Eignung": WEG 355f.
With that we now ask: How does one see the table's genesis as genesis? In the shop we certainly see various movements (the car-, penter hammers, saws, carves), but our question is about the movement of the wood itself into the e i d o s "table-" We cannot actually see the table yet (although we might envision i t ) , and if we are looking for generation, we do not merely see wood as wood. What we see is the appropriation of the wood into a table; we see the wood as appropriated unto, as underway to, a table. The generation of the table as genera tion is the on-going appropriation-unto-a-new-telos^wherein the wood changes from mere wood to wood that is appropriated for.... The kind of k inesis that we call genesis is he[ tou dynatou hei dynaton entelecheia (Physics G, 1, 201 b 4f.) . In generation the wood is read from the telos "table" (entelecheia) but as not yet fully there (hei dynaton). Its very Being is seen as the process of Being-appropriated (on hei dynaton = on dynamei) . When one says that much, the mention of entelecheia, because tautological, becomes superfluous: dynamis says entelecheia ateles. "Appropriation" (Eignung) suffices to define the Being of a being that is in process of generation.
If we move from the generation of an artifact to that of a natural being, we find the same structure with an important addition. The eidos that controls the Being-status of the table-under-construction as on dynamei is from outside that which is being produced: it is the car penter's eidos prohaireton. Because external, that eidos of itself does not provide from out of itself the "appropriate material" for the table. Rather, it sends the carpenter into the woods in search of it. How ever, in the generation of a natural being ("man generates man"-Physics 193 b 8f.), the controlling eidos is within the very generation itself, and hence the process of generation is self-provision of what is "ap propriate for...". The "from which" (McDermott Sr.) and the "to which" (McDermott Jr.) have the same eidos ("Man"). The process of generation as a Being-underway from Senior to Junior (genesis as physeos hodos eis physin -cf. 193 b 12f.) never has to go outside of itself, but rather consists simply in deriving from one instantiation of the eidos (McDermott Sr.) the second instantiation of the same eidos (McDermott Jr.) Yet, as a Being-underway of physis to more of the same, natural generation is never a simple circling back on itself (McDermott Sr. does not generate McDermott Sr.) but is always the production of a new and unique instantia tion that never exhausts the power for yet more generation. 1 The inexhaustibility of physis as power of generation (genesis) can be expressed as "a going back into itself and towards itself, one that remains a £ power for ever more} e m e r g i n g . Physis remains physis, ever repeatableretrievable hidden-present source of possibility for the appearance of a 71 Cf-James Joyce, Ulysses, New York: Modern Library, 1961,p. 731: "...he is always the last term of a preceding series even if the first term of a succeeding one, each imagining himself to be first, last, only and alone, whereas he is neither first nor last nor only nor alone in a series originating in and repeated to infinity." 72'WEG 367. physei o n . Again: Wiederholung. But as such it is "self"-appropria tion of that inexhaustible hidden source unto the limited appearance of its instances. Hence: E i g n u n g . Wiederholung = Eignung.
III. 5. Summary and Transition
We saw (section II) that a "phenomenological" reading of Aristotle awakened the possibility of a radical restatement of the question "What is the analogically unified meaning of the various modes in which beings appear in logos?" by calling forth the prior, foundational question "What is the unified meaning of the modes of Being of logos itself?" Our explication (section III) of Heidegger*s reading of physis in Aristotle, although it did not deal directly with logos, has taken us a few steps in the direction of that foundational question.
The Being of a delimited region of beings is a unique mode of appearance in logos, a unified twofoldness of presence and absence where the absence too is a mode of presence and indeed the very condition for presentness. At least this much is clear: If logos is the deloticrevelatory horizon (deloun -aletheuein) correlative to at least natural beings, then one of the modes of Being of logos must be a bringing-topresence by a revelation of absence as the condition for presence. Logos itself, at least in one of its modes of Being, is energeia ateles.
But Heidegger goes further. If Metaphysics G, 3, maintains the same position as Physics B, 1, namely that physis is only one kind of ousia (cf. 1005 a 34f.), Metaphysics G, 1, reverses the perspective and says that ousia is a kind of physis (1003 a 27).7^ Heidegger claims that this latter text in Aristotle is an echo of the original understanding of physis as "the Being of beings as such and in totality,"* 74 7 5 of which the properly Aristotelian physis is only a "late derivative."7^ Fragment 123 of Heraclitus, for instance, says physis kryptesthai philei, "Being loves to hide itself."7^ Heidegger interprets the maxim to say not that Being is hard to get at and so requires great effort in order to be pulled fortĥ 'WEG 369f. Cf. EM 12f. (13, cited inaccurately from and purged of its concealment, but rather that self-hiding is of the essence of Being and is the basis for its limited emergence into appearance. "And therefore the kryptesthai of physis is not to be overcome, not to be stripped from physis; rather the task is the much more difficult one of allowing physis,in all the purity of its essence, the kryptesthai that belongs to it."77 Against such a background as this Heidegger projects the twofold program of Sein und Zeit. (1) Let phenomenology take logos itself as its theme, let logos "reflectively" turn on itself and read its own constitutive aletheuein-function as phenomenon. Let phenomenology exhibit that logos is "noch immer unterwegs,"78 that it "always exists in just such a manner that its 'not-yet' belongs to i t , "^ further, that logos1 authentic self-appropriâtion (die Eigentlichkeit) of that 1 1 not-yetM as a Being-towards-possibility "is what constitutes its outer most possibility of Being,and that this self-appropriation is achieved when possibility "is cultivated a£ possibility" and "endured as possibility"81 -that is, in a Wiederholung of possibility.
(2) On the basis of that, let phenomenology read (Sein und Zeit, zweiter Teil) the history of philosophy backwards to Aristotle in order to exhibit that the concealed meaning of Being is physis in the original sense noted above, and let it use the time-character of energeia as its clue in this "destruction-appropriation" of the tradition.
In short: Sein und Zeit projects a twofold Wiederholung (of existence, of the tradition) grounded in the paradigmatic meaning of physis as Wiederholung and issuing in an appropriation of physis a s appropriation, indeed as Ereignis. 
IV. DYNAMIS as DYNAMIS
79'sz 243 (287).
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itself into appearance, it aims at a self-appropriation that only the individual person can perform for himself. The work therefore functions as a protreptic to self-appropriation. As a hermeneutic in which "the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which existence itself possesses, are announced to existence's understanding of Being,"82 8 3 8 4 * * Sein und Zeit functions as an "attestation to existence of existence's ownmost Being-possible."88 It functions as a "call of conscience" unto self-appropriation or resolve.
As such, Sein und Zeit functions as a call of existence to authentic time. The central chapters of the work (Division Two, chapters 2 and 3) bear a footnote that says, "These observations and those which follow after were communicated as theses on the occasion of a public lecture on the concept of time, which was given at Marburg in July 1924."°T hat lecture, entitled "Der Begriff der Zeit," is "the Urform of Sein und Zeit,"88 and ends by transforming the question "Was ist die Zeit?" into the protreptic question, "Bin ich die Zeit? Oder noch nâher, bin ich meine Zeit?" Clearly the apex of Sein und Zeit is the call to re solve. And in resolve, as self-appropriâtion of the dynamis that one is, authentic time breaks forth as a self-repetition/retrieve of possibility as possibility. In that moment of insight (Augenblick88 ) one has not merely "understood" the analogically unified meaning of Being in a dis interested and detached way, but has been called into it as the very meaning of one's own Being. In authentically appropriating one's own temporality, one is appropriated into Being itself as time. The unity of temporality-^time is what Heidegger calls the event of appropriation, Ereignis.87 In what follows I will show: (1) that resolve is the core of Sein und Zeit, (2) how resolve is a Wiederholung, and (3) how resolve is the entrance into Ereignis. 
IV. 1. Resolve: The Unifying Center of Sein und Zeit
The published portion of Sein und Zeit is divided into two equal parts, the first exhibiting the unified structure of logos (existence) as disclosure/concern/truth, the second demonstrating that the meaning of that unified structure as a whole is temporality. Together these show that the fundamental structure of logos is disclosure possibilized by temporality. That structure is the horizon for reading the meaning of Being as the analogical unity of the many ways beings can be dis closed in a temporally determined logos. Let us take up temporality and disclosure in order to see their unity.
The word "temporality" could be misleading if one were to forget that by "time" Heidegger means not Aristotle*s arithmos kineseos, the numbering of ontic movement, but rather kinesis itself, movedness as the Being of the unique moving being that is man. Thus: "The Being-asmoved ĵBewegtheit"j of existence is not the motion £ Bewequnq^o f some thing present-at-hand.1,88 As early as his 1921-22 course, PhKnomenologische Interpretation (Aristotles P h y s i k ) Heidegger sets his task as the phenomenological clarification of Leben as the Grund^ bewegtheit whose basic characteristic is Sorge. In the 1922 continua tion of that course he says that for the Greeks and particularly for Aristotle, logos is a kinesis. In Ontologie : Hermeneutik der Faktizitat (1923) he reads this Bewegtheit as existence's limited way of "havingitself-there" (Sich-Da-Haben), that is, energeia atelês. In the same course this unique temporality is called "kairologisch" in order to distinguish its ontological character from the ontic "chronological" character of movement. Clearly "temporality" in Sein und Zeit is under stood in terms of kinesis, Being-moved. To say that disclosive existence is primordial temporality is to read logos as energeia atelês.
But what of disclosure in relation to temporality? Logos achieves its proper Being when it actively appropriates itself as what it already is. For the most part, logos functions as disclosure (Erschlossenheit) without being aware of it. The disclosure to logos of the fact that it is itself disclosive as finite possibility (= the call to resolve/ Entschlossenheit) is the preeminent mode of disclosure and is revelatory of resolve as the highest possibility of existence.88 ln fact, in resolve temporality is for the first time revealed; what is more, resolve i s authentic temporality.88 Therefore Richardson is correct in calling resolve "der Kern" and "die Vollendung" of Sein und Zeit.* 88 8 -SZ 374f. In fine, we may read the unity of Sein und Zeit as that of Erschlossenheit and Entschlossenheit. Logos1s fundamental structure as disclosive temporality is the structure of resolve. And resolve is a unique (because fully "self-aware") mode of energeia atelês.
IV. 2. Resolve as Wiederholung
It is clear from Sein und Zeit that existence is through and through nothing other than Being-possible,92 and that this Being-possible, as opening up a world, is the structure that accounts for the disclosure of the Being of all encountering beings, including existence itself as ontic. As Being-possible, existence (even when it does not know it) is "ahead of itself," where the "itself" designates its inauthentic s e l f . 93 This being-possible is first of all not something that existence has chosen for itself, rather it is already de facto operative. To express the de-facto-ness of Being-possible, Heidegger speaks of "already pro jected possibility" (geworfene Moglichkeit9^) or simply "projectedness" (Geworfenheit* 9 3 9 4 95 9 6 9 7 ). Insofar as projected possibility effects disclosure, we may equally speak of it as "projecting" or "project" (entwerfend, Entwurf98) -But the active^oice in no way indicates some dif ferent kind of possibility.
It merely says that, as already projected possibility, existence is disclosive (verstehend, erschliessend) , that is, grounded in logos/Rede as the meaningful articulation of the arena opened up by projected possibility.98 sz 144 (183). I believe that there is little value in the translations of "geworfen" and "Geworfenheit" as "thrown" and "thrownness." Heidegger is attempting to convey, in the various formations of "werfen," the sense of "Schlag" as his rendering of the Greek ballein, metabole, ekbole, Cf. WEG 319.
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sz 135 (174) If logos as Rede is underdeveloped in the first division of Sein und Zeit, it is because its proper function emerges as the call to resolve in the second division. As projected-disclosive possibility, existence has first of all been "brought into" possibility, but "not of its own accord," "not as itself," "not through itself," not "under standing^," hence "forgetfully."^ The preeminent role of logos is to make transparent to existence, as projected and unappropriated pos sibility, its very nature as possibility.
Logos as conscience is "an attestation [[to existence] of existence's ownmost Being-possible. As such it is a "calling back" (Ruckruf^-^) • But that to which it calls existence back is existence's own Being-already-ahead-of-itself. The calling back is in fact a calling forth (vorrufendes Ruckruf-*-^) • More specifically, in calling existence back to its ahead-ness, it summons existence to take over that projectedness understanding^, to seize upon it authentically, to own it as its own.
If existence does so, it does not become something different, but rather repeats / retrieves itselfand becomes understandingly what it already is. 04 It comes back to its already-projectedness by taking up this "ground" anew so as to authentically be it.
And how is_ existence [[authentically] this already projected ground? Only in that it (understandingly]
projects itself £i.e., discloses itself] in terms of possibilities into which it has already been 1 OR projected. u
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resolve is described as "the taking over of projectedness"10^ and as "the understanding coming-back to the already-dimension of one's ownmost Being,1,100 that is, a self-disclosive retrieve and appropriation of the projected possibility that existence already is. This "retrievingrepeating of itself" is the event whereby existence "discloses... possibility as possibility."109 Such a retrieving-repeating (Wiederholung110) that discloses possi bility (Eignung) as possibility is originalauthentic time -the first goal towards which Sein und Zeit moves.
The Gewesen-dimension of every day unappropriated existence is its d£ facto state of being the already projected possibility that discloses beings.
This already-projectedness, even in its unappropriated state, has an intrinsic "futural" dimension to it. As projected possibility, existence is never all at once and static, but rather is always on-the-way, not to some goal but simply to more of itself:
"...existence, as being, is always coming towards itself..."111 * 1 1 3 Geworfenheit is of itself zukunftig, the unity of the "two" dimensions constituting the presentness of existence as disclosive temporality. But if existence's very structure (geworfen-entwerfend, gewesen-zukunftig) is temporal, its temporality is generally and for the most part closed off from existence.
Logos as conscience makes that structure trans parent by disclosing disclosive temporality to itself so that, in resolve, existence may take over its own possibility by re-grasping or re-finding it (wiederholen). Resolve frees (cf. Sichuberliefern)11^ that structure for existence so that existence can take over its own possibility. When it does so, existence does not draw already projected possibility (das dagewesene Dasein) into full present appearance (cf. "nicht, urn es abermals zu v e r w i c k l i c h e n " H 3 ) ^ but brings it into presence by leaving it In brief: Resolve as authentic time is the self-appropriation of one's own Being as dynamis, it is a self-aware allowing of oneself to appear by not appearing.
Existence re-grasps itself as already projected pos sibility by letting that projected possibility remain the ever repeatable hidden-present source for the appearance of existence as Being-possible. In yet other terms, it is the concrete acceptance of and entrance into the aletheia-process itself as always grounded in a "aletheia", an absence that remains absence in allowing presence. But when logos reads and resolutely appropriates itself, it appropriates its own appearancepresence as the re-petition of its own absence-from-appearance. In resolved existence, dynamis/Eignung/Wiederholung is on a higher ("selfaware") level than in non-existential natural beings. Eignung resolutely reveals itself to itself as Eignung? Wiederholung resolutely re-grasps itself as Wiederholung. Presence-by-absence allows itself to be presenceby-absence.
The "model" for resolve is clearly dynamis, but resolve is a transformation of dynamis into "self-aware" dynamis. This unique "form" of Eignung which resolutely reveals itself to itself a s _ Eignung is what Heidegger in his 1928 seminar calls Ereignis.
IV. 3. Resolve and Ereignis
But beyond mere word-comparisons, we must spell out the issue for it self. The Being of a being is its disclosed presentness in logos. The meaning of Being a£ such can be had only if logos reads and appropriates the unified meaning of itself as disclosive presenting.
Such a disclosure of disclosive presenting is an alêtheuein of the alêtheia-process itself. Since the alêtheia-process is disclosure rooted in possibility, the alêtheuein of alêtheia reveals that the unified meaning of Being is pos sibility as possibility, disclosure/presence rooted in non-disclosure/ absence. But the authentic disclosure of the unified meaning of dis closure is not some disinterested act of knowledge, for example, reading and understanding Sein und Zeit. To read Sein und Zeit "correctly" is to read it as a protreptic, a call to one's own personal, existentiell self appropriation of the unified meaning of disclosure.
Concretely, such self appropriation is a living in the aletheia-process, letting oneself be drawn into absence as the condition for all presentness of beings, including one's own.
To appropriate aletheia means to let oneself be appropriated into dynamis as such: it is to re-grasp or come back to one's already projected possibility by letting it remain possible, i.e., hidden-present ever retrievable source for all presentness of beings."^4 To live in alêtheia is to experience Being (the disclosed presence of beings) as "given" in oneself only by experiencing withdrawal from presence as such. One knows "withdrawal from presence" only as that withdrawal is registered in one's own being drawn out ahead of oneself (early Heidegger: Geworfenheit; later Heidegger, Angezogenheit, etc. 15). One knows the "giving" of presence only insofar as that givenness (Geschick) is registered in one's presenting of beings in meaning.
There is no hypostasization of "something" that withdraws or gives, no objection of "something" that disposes over the movedness of one's temporality as dynamis. There is only the resolute experience of the self as not being ultimately at its own disposal.
To say that is not to import some romantic "mystery" into philosophy, but simply to take seriously and rigorously the meaning of Being as dynamis.
From another perspective, if one brings beings "to language" (i.e., to fundamental meaningful presence in logos), one does so precisely by not having language (logos as dynamis) at one's disposal. Not that some "voice" then tells us what beings are. There is no such voice, only the silence (Schweigen) that characterizes the absence that possibilizes the meaningful presence of a being in logos. And the most authentic response to such silence is "silence about silence" (Geschwiegen . . .über das Schweigen^-^), that is, letting the absence be absence. Such a "stance" towards silence might be called a "hearing," but the message one hears is that there is no message other than the already givenness (Geschick) of meaning in the space of man's absence. Such a "stance" might also be called "reverence," but there is no authority to revere other than "the repeatable possibilities of existence," indeed, the repeatable possibilities of possibility itself as re-petition. 
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Phrases like "silence about silence" and "reverent attentiveness" are but halting ways of describing die Sache selbst, that is, ways of describing how, in appropriating one's own Being as dynamis, one is appropriated into the center of meaning, dynamis itself. "The question of existence," Heidegger once wrote, "is never settled except through existing itself."118
Further: "Every answer keeps its force as answer only so long as it is rooted in questioning.
The two sentences say the same thing: only in concrete existentiell appropriation of oneself as the act of questioning does questioning find its answer, namely, that the meaning of Being is questionableness itself. Only in resolve does one enter Ereignis. The meaning of Being is not a doctrine to be learned but a risk to be taken.
If one does not take that risk, Heidegger says, "all talk and listening is in vain. And in that case I would urge you to burn your lecture notes, however precise they may be -and the sooner the better."12 1
V. Conclusion: DYNAMIS and the Question of Rigor
It seems that this essay has accomplished its goal of showing that and how Heidegger's understanding of Wiederholung in his reading of Aristotle's physis lays the foundation for his understanding of the "issue itself," Ereignis. We have seen that Heidegger's work is not a "doctrine" unless that word be taken to mean a teaching about an essentially "unsayablë" to which man is opened up "in order that he might spend himself on it without counting the cost" (WEG 109).
In that sense Heidegger's writings remain a protreptic: Man is already "at" the issue itself, already "at" the ec-centric center of meaning, but in such a way that he needs to appropriate his own essence if he is to be authentically where he is. To heed that protreptic is to enter upon a path with no goal, for: "Ailes ist Weg"l22
For those who finally want more, this is not very much. 
